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Abstract
Cost growth is a problem in U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) acquisitions. A
particular component of cost growth is a cost overrun or Over Target Baseline (OTB). In
2009, Trahan found that the Gompertz growth curve better predicted program Estimates
at Completion (EAC) for OTB contracts. In 2010, Thickstun studied “the relationships
between overruns and a variety of factors,” but found OTB occurrences “random” and
questioned the benefit of the OTB process (Thickstun, 2010). In this research, we study
OTB‟s ability to effect improved program cost performance; we examine OTB‟s effect
on the cumulative Cost Performance Index (CPI) slope after an OTB intervention. We
find there is no statistically significant change in cumulative CPI slope after OTB. For
the data studied, an OTB investment does not significantly improve management‟s ability
to earn cost value as reflected in the cumulative CPI slope.
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CONTRACT OVER TARGET BASELINE (OTB) EFFECT ON EARNED VALUE
MANAGEMENT’S COST PERFORMANCE INDEX (CPI)
I: Introduction
Background
The U.S. Department of Defense and our Nation face a timeless challenge: match
finite financial resources to prioritized joint-capability requirements while earning the
greatest capability value per acquisition dollar spent. The U.S. Government
Accountability Office (GAO) has rated the Department of Defense‟s (DoD) Defense
Acquisition System (DAS) as a “high-risk” area since 1990 for its costly and
“fragmented” approach to identifying and acquiring materiel solutions to meet joint
defense capability requirements (GAO, 2009).
The inability to acquire joint defense capabilities at contracted costs and within
scheduled timeframes is a continuing DoD problem. As reported in fiscal year 2008
dollars (Table 1), the DOD‟s estimated total acquisition cost growth relating to its
investment in 95 major defense programs is $295 billion; this cost growth is accompanied
by an average schedule delay in delivering initial capabilities of 21 months (GAO, 2008).

Table 1: Analysis of DOD Major Defense Acquisition Programs (GAO-08-604CG)
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A particular subcomponent of cost growth is a cost overrun or Over Target
Baseline (OTB) contract; essentially, an OTB reflects a contractor‟s inability to produce a
required capability at a specified contracted cost. Further, OTB signifies management‟s
decision to establish a new Earned Value Management (EVM) Performance
Measurement Baseline (PMB) “to improve managerial control over the execution of the
remaining work in a project” (DAU, 2007). OTB is a very detailed, ten-step process that
requires active commitment from all acquisition stakeholders assigned to that contract
effort. Per the DAU guidebook, the OTB motto is “Do it once! Do it right!” (DAU,
2007).
In 2009, Trahan found that nonlinear growth modeling, specifically the Gompertz
growth curve, better predicted program Estimates at Completion (EAC) for OTB
contracts (Trahan, 2009). In 2010, Thickstun attempted to complement Trahan‟s
research by producing an OTB prediction model based on logistic regression and found
that OTB is a random occurrence for the data studied and questioned the value of the
OTB process (Thickstun, 2010). Thickstun reports that “there have been over $17 billion
in cost overruns related to OTBs since 2000” and for the dataset studied, “approximately
twenty percent of all acquisition contracts in the DoD experienced cost overruns over the
past 20 years” (Thickstun, 2010).
At the contract level, internal control aimed at producing program-level decision
support was instituted by the DoD decades ago. Since the 1960‟s, the DoD has required
major defense acquisition contractors to comply with Earned Value Management (EVM)
standards and financial reporting as a means to control cost, schedule and performance
(Fleming, 2000). The Cost Performance Index (CPI) is a critical EVM cost performance
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metric. The CPI is not only a measure of cost performance health, it is a statistic utilized
in predicting a program's Estimate at Completion (EAC). For its importance, the CPI has
been a critical topic of academic research centered on EAC methods and CPI heuristics.
In 2008, Henderson states “the widely reported CPI stability rule cannot be generalized
even within the US Defense Department (US DoD) project portfolio” and referring to the
goal of improving project performance, “an understanding of project characteristics,
which result in progressively improving CPI would, if these characteristics could be
emulated in other programs, be an extremely useful advance to practice” (Henderson,
2008). Identifying specific PM actions that improve the cumulative CPI, correspondingly
increasing the value of the cumulative CPI slope, is the goal of our research.
As it relates to the CPI, an OTB intervention typically removes any cost variance
associated with contract performance and resets the CPI to a value of one. Given the CPI
is reset to one, the only method of determining OTB effectiveness on the CPI is to study
the cumulative CPI trend or the cumulative CPI slope after OTB. The cumulative CPI
slope change (comparing slopes before and after OTB) provides a generic measurement
that can be examined for all types of programs regardless of technical risk, appropriation
and programmatic content. The goal of OTB is to improve managerial control of a
project's remaining work in terms of cost, schedule and performance; if effective, OTB
should increase the cumulative CPI slope.

3

Purpose
Given “the DoD is entrusted with more taxpayer dollars than any other federal
agency", it is incumbent upon management (at the enterprise and program levels) to
identify and implement management actions that produce improved acquisition outcomes
(GAO, 2009). Our research attempts to identify program management actions that
produce a positive managerial cost effect; specifically, we examine OTB process actions
(treatment) for a positive effect on the rate of earning cost value as measured by the
cumulative CPI slope after OTB.

Research Questions and Methodology
Our research aims to answer the following questions:

1) Does the OTB process (treatment) improve the cumulative CPI's rate of
change (cumulative CPI slope) after OTB?
2) Is the cumulative CPI slope after OTB sensitive to time and/or programmatic
factors to include contract type, military service and the purpose of the appropriation?

To answer these questions, we examine the cumulative CPI rate of change, the
slope of the line created by cumulative CPI data points before and after OTB.

Similar to

past OTB and EVM research, the DoD Defense Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES)
database is the source of our data. Cumulative CPI is not distributed normally, therefore,
we utilize a nonparametric test (Mann-Whitney Test) to determine whether there is a
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statistically significant difference in the cumulative CPI slopes before and after OTB,
which we describe in Chapter 3.

Chapter Summary
OTB seeks to gain managerial control over remaining work in terms of cost,
schedule and performance. Earning greater capability value for every dollar spent is a
timeless challenge that cuts across every DoD acquisition program regardless of life cycle
stage, platform and program risk. As stewards of taxpayer funds, the DoD should exploit
acquisition actions that produce improved cost, schedule and performance outcomes and
divest itself of acquisition actions that fail to produce the same. Chapter II provides a
review of past research concerning EVM and OTB. In Chapter III, we explain the source
of our data, present the hypothesis test and explain the statistical test. In Chapters IV and
V, we summarize the results of our analysis and provide policy implications based on our
findings.
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II: Literature Review
In this chapter, we expand on the EVM architecture, the historical body of EVM
research and emphasize CPI characteristics. Additionally, we define the term OTB,
discuss the OTB process and emphasize the stated purpose of OTB.

Earned Value Management (EVM) Overview
Since its inception, EVM has been a program management (PM) tool that ties
cost, schedule and performance into an integrated program baseline; essentially, the EVM
construct serves as a roadmap of execution and an internal control mechanism to assess
project status and future completion. In a memorandum dated 3 Jul 07, USD AT&L
Kenneth J. Krieg described EVM as a project management best practice that “provides a
disciplined approach to managing projects successfully through the use of an integrated
system to plan and control authorized work to achieve cost, schedule and performance
objectives” (Krieg, 2007).
Contractor earned value management systems (EVMS) rest on 32 guidelines or
industry standards established by American National Standards Institute
(ANSI)/Electronic Industries Alliance (EIA); “the DoD formally adopted ANSI/EIA-748
in August 1998 for application to major defense acquisition programs” (DCMA, 2006).
The guidelines are not prescriptive, but give government contractors the flexibility to
develop business information systems that accurately collect and report acquisition
program execution data to enable resource decision-making (DCMA, 2006). OMB
Circular No. A-11 (OMB A-11), Section 300, establishes policy for planning, budgeting,
acquisition and management of Federal capital assets “to ensure scarce public resources
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are wisely invested” (OMB, Jun 08). OMB A-11 references EVM contract criteria set
forth in the Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). FAR 7.105(b)(10) discusses EVMS
performance analysis and calls for EVMS compliance language in written acquisition
plans. Further, FAR 34.201and 34.202 mandate EVMS for major development
acquisition in accordance with agency procedures and ANSI/EIA-748 standards and calls
for program Integrated Baseline Reviews (IBR) when EVMS is required. FAR 34.203
directs the insertion of an EVMS contract clause in solicitations requiring a contractor
EVMS. In terms of agency procedures, the Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation
Supplement (DFARS) 234.2 and the DoD Instruction 5000.2, Operation of the Defense
Acquisition System, prescribe mandatory EVM requirements for cost and incentive
contracts. These regulations require formal compliance validation of contractor EVMS
with ANSI/EIA-748 for cost and incentive contracts ≥ $50 million. Further, for cost and
incentive contracts from $20-50 million, a formal validation is not required, but
ANSI/EIA-748 compliance is required. Finally, for any contract less than $20 million,
PMs have discretion and can decide whether the cost of an EVMS is justified by its
benefits (DAU, 2009).
Beyond the purpose and regulatory requirements, EVM is a simple and useful PM
tool. The foundation of EVM is the Performance Measurement Baseline (PMB); Cukr
describes it well by stating "the purpose of a performance measurement baseline is to
capture the technical work and performance requirements, the time limitations, and the
resource constraints of a project in a time-phased, dollarized plan for successfully
accomplishing the project" (Cukr, 2000). The importance of an accurate and disciplined
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PMB cannot be overstated. The DAU EVM "Gold Card" (Appendix A) provides a
summary of EVM calculations and terms (DAU, 2009).

Figure 1: DAU Gold Card, 2009

The PMB, the Budgeted Cost of Work Scheduled (BCWS) or the Planned Value
(PV) is the starting point of EVM analysis; "the focus of earned value has been
consistent: the accurate measurement of physical performance against a detailed plan (or
PV) to allow for the accurate prediction of the final costs and schedule results for a given
project" (Fleming, 2000). As a program executes and data is collected from Contract
Performance Reports (CPR), the Budgeted Cost of Work Performed (BCWP) or the
Earned Value (EV) is compared to the Actual Cost of Work Performed (ACWP) or the
Actual Cost (AC) and the Budgeted Cost of Work Scheduled (BCWS) or the Planned
Value (PV) at "time now" to determine the Cost Variance (CV) and the Schedule
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Variance (SV), respectively. These variances, positive or negative, provide program
managers insight into the current cost and schedule status of the project. At "time now",
two performance metrics can be generated by dividing EV by AC and EV by PV. The
first calculation, EV/AC, produces the Cost Performance Index (CPI). The CPI is a "time
now" metric that measures contractor cost performance. The second calculation, EV/PV,
produces the Schedule Performance Index (SPI). The SPI measures contractor schedule
performance. EVM cost analysts and PMs utilize the CPI, the SPI and various
combinations of the two indices (SCI product and Composite additive weighting) as
performance factors (Table 2) to calculate a range of Estimates at Completion (EAC).

Table 2: EVM Performance Indices (Thickstun, 2010)

Once the performance factors are determined and the Budget At Completion
(BAC) is known, index-based EACs are calculated by adding the AC to the quotient of
remaining work divided by a selected performance factor (Table 2). Christensen
provides an excellent example of EVM's simplicity and utility in calculating a range of
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EACs. In the wake of the A-12 cancellation, Christensen developed Tables 3 and 4 to
demonstrate the utility of the earned value management report (Christensen, 1999).

Table 3 (Christensen, 1999)
Cost Performance Data for A-12 Program
(April 1990, Millions of Dollars)

(See Appendix A for EVM acronym definitions and equations.)

Table 4 (Christensen, 1999)
A Range of Estimates at Completion for A-12 Program
(Derived from the Cumulative Performance Data in Table 2)

(See Appendix A for EVM acronym definitions and equations.)

Having calculated the index-based performance factors (Table 4) from the cost
data (Table 3), Christensen effectively displayed a lower and upper bound range of
Estimates at Completion (EAC) available to A-12 program leadership (Table 4).
Christensen‟s example demonstrates the relative simplicity of EVM calculations, but
highlights its usefulness in decision support.
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Commenting on the large number of EAC calculation formulas, Fleming and
Koppelman characterize the cumulative CPI based EAC calculations (Table 4) as "three
of the more accepted formulas" (Fleming and Koppelman, 2000).

The Cost Performance Index (CPI)
Characterization of the CPI is particularly important to our research. Fleming and
Koppelman characterize the CPI as a “delicate relationship between the value of the work
physically completed and in process, related to the actual costs incurred for doing such
work” (Fleming and Koppelman, 2000). Additionally, the CPI is a generic metric that
accommodates all types of programs and levels of technical risk and “reflects the health
of (a) project” (Fleming and Koppelman, 2000). Regardless of the specific program, the
CPI highlights cost variance and directs management attention to negative trends.
By definition, the Cost Performance Index is BCWP/ACWP, the quotient of
Budgeted Cost of Work Performed (BCWP) divided by the Actual Cost of Work
Performed (ACWP); the CPI is a measure of cost efficiency or cost performance relating
Earned Value (EV) to Actual Cost (AC). Cumulative CPI (CPIcum) relates total EV to
total AC for “time now”, while CPI in general can relate EV to AC for any defined
period. CPI values less than one indicate an unfavorable overrun condition and CPI
values greater than one indicate a favorable underrun condition. In a scenario of perfect
knowledge and perfect execution, the CPI is consistently a value of one. Figure 2 depicts
all three scenarios.
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Cost Performance Index (CPIcum)

CPIcum Characterization
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Figure 2: Characterization of the Cost Performance Index (CPI cum)

The CPI provides a great deal of programmatic insight, especially into the PMB‟s
technical risk. Recall that the PMB is a “time-phased, dollarized plan” that represents the
planned technical work packages for a particular program; it is an estimated plan (Cukr,
2000). With any estimated plan, there exists risk and uncertainty and that uncertainty is
reflected in the actual execution of the program. In a “perfect knowledge” scenario, the
program produces a capability exactly as planned; the program earns $1 dollar of value
for every $1 dollar of actual cost. The program‟s CPI is perfectly constant at a value of
one (Figure 2) and the cumulative CPI slope is horizontal. Depicted as the Overrun CPI
slope, the program that lacks perfect knowledge and estimates optimistically will earn
less than $1 dollar of value for every $1 dollar of cost. Conversely and depicted as the
Underrun CPI slope, the program that lacks perfect knowledge and estimates
conservatively will earn greater than $1 dollar of earned value per $1 dollar of cost. CPI
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directly reflects the cost performance of the program and provides insight into program
technical risk and/or the quality of the estimating process. Additionally, the slope of the
cumulative CPI provides insight into management‟s ability or inability to actively
improve its cost position and performance.

Historical EVM Research

EVM research centers on EAC prediction methods and cumulative CPI heuristics.
In a comprehensive review of twenty-five proposed or comparative EAC studies that
explored index, regression and other methods, Christensen concluded that “no one
formula or model is always best” and “the accuracy of index-based formulas depends on
the type of system, and the stage and phase of the contracts” (Christensen, 1995). Since
that time, Tracy examined regression based EAC models and found that regression
models only outperform index-based models at early stages of completion (Tracy, 2005).
In 2009 Trahan produced three EAC models using the Gompertz growth curve and
concluded that growth models, depending on model and phase, are “a more accurate
estimating tool for identified OTB contract‟s EAC as compared to the CPI, SCI and
Composite Index methods” (Trahan, 2009). Noted by Thickstun, these findings add
further support to Christensen's 1995 research that there is no one EAC method that
outperforms the others in all situations (Thickstun, 2010). Further, through logistic
regression analysis of various OTB program factors, Thickstun attempted to complement
Trahan‟s research by developing a model to predict OTB contracts. Thickstun concluded
that “the ability to predict OTBs was no better than a coin flip” for the data studied and
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“it suggests that OTBs may occur randomly”; she goes on to question the benefits of the
OTB process (Thickstun, 2010).
Within EVM, the CPI is a central index utilized in almost every performance
factor EAC calculation. Additionally, CPI research has developed rules of thumb
(heuristics) that empower PMs to test EAC confidence and understand program stability.
The following CPI heuristics are particularly useful in evaluating a contractor‟s EAC.
“Research has shown that the EAC derived from the CPI is a reasonable floor to
the final cost” (Christensen, 1996).
“When the cumulative CPI is significantly less than TCPI, it is highly doubtful
that the contract will be completed at the EAC” (Christensen, 1999).
“The smallest and largest EACs were derived from the CPI and the product of the
CPI and SPI, respectively” (Christensen, 1999).

The PM‟s ability to improve cost performance is particularly important to our
research and directly tied to CPI stability. Concerning DoD cumulative CPI stability,
defined by Christensen as “cumulative CPI does not change by more than plus or minus
0.10 from its value at the 20 percent completion point”, the following heuristics are cited.
DoD research supports the fact that DoD programs are unable to change their
cumulative CPI by +/- 10% once the 20% program completion point is achieved
(Christensen and Payne, 1992).
“A stable CPI is evidence that the contractor‟s management control systems,
particularly the planning, budgeting, and accounting systems are functioning
properly” and “thus indicate that the contractor‟s final costs of authorized work,
termed „Estimate at Completion,‟ are reliable” (Christensen and Payne, 1992).
“Knowing that the CPI is stable may help the analyst evaluate the capability of a
contractor to recover from a cost overrun by comparing the CPI with other key
indicators” (Christensen and Payne, 1992).
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Cumulative CPI “does not change by more than 10 percent once the contract is 20
percent complete; in fact, it tends to decrease” (Christensen, 1993).
“Recoveries from cost overruns on defense contracts are extremely rare,
especially when the project is more than 20 percent complete” (Christensen,
1999).
“Based on an analysis of 155 defense acquisition contracts, Christensen and Heise
(1993) reported that the range of the cumulative CPI from the 20 percent
completion point to contract completion was less than 0.20 for every contract.
This result is usually interpreted to mean that the cumulative CPI does not change
by more than plus or minus 0.10 from its value at the 20 percent completion point,
and is used to evaluate the reasonableness of projected cost efficiencies on future
work” (Christensen and Templin, 2002).

In 2008, Henderson and Zwikael re-examined CPI stability and found contrary
evidence inside and outside of the DoD. In their study of twelve Israeli Hi-Tech projects,
twenty United Kingdom construction projects and five Australian IT projects for
cumulative CPI stability, they state "this research does not support the previously
referenced generalizations that the CPI stability rule has universal applicability for all
projects utilizing the EVM method" (Henderson, 2008). Specifically concerning the
aforementioned international contracts, Henderson and Zwikael found "that (CPI)
stability is usually achieved very late in the project lifecycle, often later than 80%
complete for projects in these samples" (Henderson, 2008).
Further, Henderson cites contradictory evidence within the DoD. In 1996,
Michael Popp, U.S. Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR), conducted a study
concerning the confidence level of programs not breaching 10% over budget. To answer
a question posed by NAVAIR's Program Executive Officer (PEO), Popp and staff
developed "probability distributions of EAC's (based on Cost Performance Index at
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Complete (CPI)) based on current CPI and % complete of programs based on history"
(Popp, 1996). Simplifying the question, Popp asked, "given a program that has CPI of X
and a percent complete of Y, what is the most likely finishing CPI" (Popp, 1996). Popp's
charts display the correlation of cumulative CPI at a defined range of percent complete to
final CPI. By 90-100% complete, the correlation is almost exactly one for all programs.
The greatest deviation (from the correlation value of one) is seen in the 10-20%
completion chart. Using Popp's correlation charts and a +/-10% CPI stability enclosure
technique, Henderson concludes from Popp's data that "CPI stability was also achieved
very late in the project lifecycle, often as late as 70-80% completion" and "this finding is
consistent with late CPI stability findings for the (international) commercial sector"
(Henderson, 2008).
The purpose of our research is not to dispute past CPI heuristics, but to inquire
into PM actions that produce an increase in final cumulative CPI. At the 10-20%
complete point, Popp's correlation chart does not display a straight line value of one,
meaning DoD programs and program managers have the ability to effect final CPI
change for better or for worse. Our research utilizes the OTB construct to define a set of
PM actions to study for its treatment effect on cumulative CPI.
In a broader EVM sense, Fleming and Koppelman state that "final forecasted
results are not necessarily preordained" and "final project results can often be altered, but
only when aggressive management actions are taken" (Fleming and Koppelman, 2000).
Consistent with EVM research and having noted several important tradeoff variables,
Fleming and Koppelman stress that aggressive action, "if taken early," can change project
outcomes (Fleming and Koppelman).
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Over Target Baseline (OTB) Overview
All of EVM starts with the Performance Measurement Baseline (PMB); the PMB
is an integrated cost, schedule and performance execution plan. In terms of changing the
PMB, Cukr states, “the reasons fall into three major categories: authorized contract
changes (negotiated changes and authorized unpriced work), internal replanning, and
inadequate remaining budget in the contract with a resulting requirement for an OTB”
(Cukr, 2000). From a requirements and funding viewpoint, authorized contract changes
represent requirement growth with commensurate funding growth, internal replanning
represents a reallocation of existing contract funds to existing contract requirements and
OTB represents the contractor‟s need for additional funds to perform the unchanged
contract budget base requirements (Cukr, 2000).
In summary, OTB reflects a contractor‟s inability to produce a required capability
at a specified contracted cost and signifies management‟s decision to establish a new
EVM Performance Measurement Baseline (PMB) “to improve managerial control over
the execution of the remaining work in a project” (DAU, 2007). OTB (cost overrun)
increases Total Allocated Budget (TAB) beyond a constant Contract Budget Base (CBB).
Before overrun
Total Allocated Budget (TAB)
Contract Budget Base (CBB)
Performance Measurement Baseline
(PMB)

Management
Reserve

After overrun
Total Allocated Budget (TAB)
Contract Budget Base (CBB)
Performance Measurement Baseline (PMB)

Over Target Budget
Management
Reserve

Figure 3: Over Target Baseline (DCMA, 2006)
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The OTB process entails ten steps in which the contractor and the customer work
together to establish a new bottoms-up estimate and integrated plan (PMB) for a
program‟s remaining work. The process involves customer approval, consensus on work
scope, consensus on the master schedule, a collaborative risk analysis and a detailed
understanding of work packages tied to budget and time constraints at the Control
Account Manager (CAM) level. The entire OTB process (Figure 4) aims at regaining
managerial control of remaining work in terms of cost, schedule and performance.

The OTB Process Flow
Statement of
Need For OTB

Consult with
Customer

Consensus On
Remaining Scope

Develop Revised
Integrated Master
Schedule

Schedule Review
& Concurrence

Consult with
Customer

Issue Guidance To
Replan Cost
Accounts

Revise Detail
Schedules & Prepare
Estimates-ToComplete

Input ETC Into
EVM System

CAM Reviews &
ETC “Scrubbing”

Finalize OTB Cost
& Schedule

Consult with
Customer

Senior Management
Cost/Schedule
Review

Establish New PMB

Figure 4: OTB Process Flow (DAU, 2007)
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OTB and CPI Interaction
During the OTB process, program managers have the choice to remove all or
some of the EVM variances; typically, elimination of all variances, “is the most common
form of variance adjustment in an OTB situation” (DAU, 2007). Cukr states, “this action
(eliminate variances) makes sense if you consider that the OTB essentially builds the past
variance trend into the baseline through the contractor‟s estimate, upon which the OTB is
built” (Cukr, 2000). In detail, elimination of the cost variance means setting the
Budgeted Cost of Work Performed (BCWP) equal to the Actual Cost of Work Performed
(ACWP), which adjusts the cumulative CPI value to one.
Adjusting the CPI to one is typical in OTB situations, but not necessary for our
study. More generically, our research examines the slope of the cumulative CPI trend
line (typically a negative slope or growing overrun) and is not necessarily interested in
the level of the cumulative CPI metric. To clarify, Figure 5 depicts two CPI trend lines

Cost Performance Index (CPIcum)

of equal slope value post an OTB intervention (OTB at Time Zero).

CPIcum Adjusted/Unadjusted for Level
Post OTB
1.2
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0

CPI Before OTB
CPI After OTB
Adjusted
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5

CPI After OTB UnAdj.

Time Periods Pre/Post OTB (Time Zero)

Figure 5: CPIcum Trend Adjusted/Unadjusted for Level Post OTB (Equal Slopes)
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In contrast to the equal pre- and post-slopes in Figure 5 above and consistent with
the theory of our research, Figure 6 depicts CPI adjusted and unadjusted for level post
OTB with a horizontal cumulative CPI slope. Figure 6 implies that the OTB process has
positively affected the cumulative CPI slope and the program in question is now
“perfectly” earning $1 dollar of earned value for every $1 dollar of actual cost regardless
of CPI level. The theoretical program, having gone through the OTB process, has rightly
assessed the remaining work, its associated risks and has properly reprogrammed a

Cost Performance Index (CPIcum)

commensurate amount of funding to the remaining effort.

CPIcum Adjusted/Unadjusted for Level
Post OTB (Positive Slope Change)
1.2
1
0.8
0.6
0.4
0.2
0

CPI Before OTB
CPI After OTB
Adjusted
-5 -4 -3 -2 -1 0 1 2 3 4 5

CPI After OTB UnAdj.

Time Periods Pre/Post OTB (Time Zero)

Figure 6: CPIcum Trend Adjusted/Unadjusted for Level Post OTB (Positive Slope Chg.)
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This type of pre- and post-OTB analysis is consistent with Cukr‟s direction to
OTB analysts concerning the elimination of cost and schedule variances as discussed
above. Cukr states “as a result (of eliminating past variances), analysts can adjust their
trend analysis by focusing on the cost and schedule trends since the OTB, and comparing
pre- and post-OTB” (Cukr, 2000). Analysts should allow "several months" of reporting
to occur prior to performing post OTB analysis based on cumulative indices (DAU,
2007). Consistent with this guidance, our analysis of post-OTB cumulative CPI slopes
begins at six months and includes all cumulative CPI points pre-OTB.
Chapter Summary
In Chapter II, we reviewed fundamental EVM and OTB concepts to include past
research and established the relationship between EVM and OTB. Specifically, we
discussed OTB's effect on cumulative CPI and characterized cumulative CPI heuristics.
Historical DoD research supports the validity and importance of index-based EAC
calculations and displays the value of CPI heuristics in evaluating contractor EACs. Of
particular importance to our current study is cumulative CPI stability. The vast majority
of DoD research (Christensen et al) finds that cumulative CPI is stable at the 20%
completion point, meaning that cumulative CPI will not deviate by +/- 10% through
program completion, but recent research provides evidence against CPI stability with the
intent of finding program actions that produce progressive cumulative CPI improvement
(Henderson, 2008). In Chapter III, we explain the source of our data, provide the
cumulative CPI slope calculation, present an OTB hypothesis test that examines OTB's
effect on cumulative CPI slope after OTB and explain the Mann-Whitney Test
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(nonparametric statistical test). In Chapters IV and V, we summarize the results of our
analysis and provide policy implications based on our findings.
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III: Data and Methodology
Data Source
Consistent with previous EVM research, we utilized cumulative and summary
EVM reports contained in the Defense Acquisition Executive Summary (DAES)
database, retrieved through the Defense Acquisition Management Information Retrieval
(DAMIR) system, for all DoD Major Defense Acquisition Programs (MDAP) as our
source data. Specifically, we compiled the cumulative and summary EVM reports of all
DAES-identified OTB contract efforts categorized by appropriation purpose (RDT&E or
Procurement), service component (Air Force, Army, DoD, Navy) and contract type (Cost
Plus and Fixed). To increase data validity, we chose "system-identified" OTB contract
efforts (OTB date data field populated in DAMIR) as the focus of our study to increase
assurance that the contractor and customer acknowledged OTB status. Our decision to
utilize "system-identified" OTB contract efforts differs from Thickstun's choice to use
DAU's definition (TAB > CBB) (Thickstun, 2010); the DAES database contained
instances of TAB exceeding CBB without the OTB data field being populated. Given the
fact that this study analyzes an OTB "treatment effect", we chose the more narrow system
query of OTB occurrences to support the assumption of contractor and customer
agreement. Once compiled, we applied four data exclusions to arrive at our final dataset.
Data Exclusions
1.) Data Purification: The dataset contained duplicate OTB dates, consecutive
OTB dates and OTB dates greater than one per quarter. To adjust, we removed duplicate
dates by sorting chronologically, combined consecutive dates to facilitate study and
removed OTB date occurrences greater than one per quarter to allow the time necessary
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to implement the OTB process. Given the number of steps in the OTB process and
inexact time definition in literature, we assumed three months as the minimum amount of
time necessary to implement an OTB. DCMA states "one to two full accounting periods
after written authorization to proceed is received should provide the contractor with
sufficient time to fully implement an OTB/OTS in required reports" (DCMA, 2006).
Given OTB written approval is required within 30 days and typical accounting periods
are monthly, the assumption of three months is consistent with the aforementioned
exclusion.

2.) Unstable Contract Budget Base (CBB): Concerning OTB implementation, “it
is usually best to isolate and separately implement the changes associated with
reprogramming (OTB)" (DAU, 2007). As discussed in our literature review, OTB is
"within-scope" reprogramming, meaning that the contract requirement is unchanged;
OTB reflects a contractor's inability to produce a defined requirement at a contracted
cost, namely an overrun. To control for requirement growth and to ensure we studied
similar requirements on either side of OTB for treatment effect, we implemented a CBB
stability rule based on mean CBB. We excluded all contract efforts that experienced
CBB change greater than +/-10% of the mean CBB ((Max CBB of effort - Min CBB of
effort) / Avg CBB of effort).
In terms of single-group research design, this exclusion increases internal validity
by removing an historical threat; if CBB has fluctuated consistently throughout the
history of the program, this fluctuation of requirement contributes to a diminished effect
and threatens internal validity (Trochim, 2008). Essentially, it is important to have a
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stable or similar requirement on either side of the OTB treatment to measure its
incremental effect on the cumulative CPI slope.

3.) Insufficient Reports (Reports count <5): Including the OTB date, if an OTB
contract effort had less than five reports (data points), it was excluded for insufficient
data. We were unable to calculate a slope before and after OTB.

4.) Multiple OTBs Removed: After applying the previous exclusions, only six
contract efforts contained two or greater OTB occurrences. Given the small sample size,
and low percentage of total OTBs studied, we excluded these OTBs from our study.
Referencing the contractor's understanding of the overrun problem and the contractor's
ability to produce a valid plan for remaining work, DCMA states that multiple OTBs
"may indicate significant underlying management problems that should be investigated"
(DCMA, 2006). Knowing that second OTBs are problematic, including this data in our
study would skew our results.

Table 5 accounts for our data exclusions. Our final dataset contains 40 contracts,
with 47 contractual efforts having 47 "system-identified" first OTBs (OTB 1s).
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Table 5: OTB Data Exclusion Accounting

Data Pull/Exclusion

Contracts (C) Efforts (E)

OTBs

OTB Delta

DAMIR/DAES (Nov 09)

2267

3231

n/a

n/a

OTB Initial Data Pull (Nov 09)

177

220

392

n/a

Exclusion 1: Data Purification

177

220

318

-74

Exclusion 2: Unstable CBB

71

89

143

-175

Exclusion 3: Insufficient Reports

40

47

53

-90

Exclusion 4: OTB 2s removed

40

47

47

-6

Final OTB Dataset

40

47

47

n/a

Slope Calculation
Since program managers typically adjust cumulative CPI to a level or value of
one during the OTB process (Figure 6), our test is only concerned with OTB's effect on
the cumulative CPI slope before and after OTB; essentially, we are looking for a positive
increase in the cumulative CPI slope. A positive slope change indicates an improvement
in management's ability to earn value or otherwise stated, management's ability to reverse
a progressively growing overrun.
We utilized simple linear regression, method of least squares, to calculate the
slopes pre- and post-OTB. With the cumulative CPI (continuous variable) on y-axis and
Time (in months) on the x-axis, we calculated the cumulative CPI slopes for all 47 OTB
occurrences with the following Least Squares Line equation (McClave, 2008).
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(1)

Given the sum of errors is zero and the sum of squared errors is minimized,
where

(beta zero) is the y-intercept and

(beta one) is the slope of the line

(McClave, 2008).
Additionally, using equation (1), we calculated cumulative CPI slopes for all 47
OTBs broken out by programmatic factors of appropriation purpose (RDT&E or
Procurement), service component (Air Force, Army, DoD, Navy) and contract type (Cost
Plus, Fixed). Further, we calculated each slope by factor and time period post-OTB.
Varying time post-OTB, we utilized six post-OTB timeframes to include six, nine,
twelve, eighteen, twenty-four and all-months. Consistent with DAU guidance, we
utilized all pre-OTB cumulative CPI data points to calculate the cumulative CPI slope
before OTB and varied time after OTB starting at six months (typically two consecutive
reporting periods) to examine the time effect. These categorical and time breakouts
enabled further sensitivity analysis; essentially, we tried to determine if OTB's effect on
cumulative CPI post-OTB was sensitive to time and/or the noted programmatic factors.
Hypothesis Test
The hypothesis test, performed at the 95% confidence level (alpha 0.05),
examines OTB's effect on cumulative CPI slope before (b) and after (a) OTB. More
specifically, we compare the median (m) location of two population probability
distributions relating to Cumulative CPI Slopes Before OTB (mb) and Cumulative CPI
Slopes After OTB (ma). The Null Hypothesis, Ho (2), states that mb is equal to ma. The
Alternative Hypothesis, Ha (3), states that mb is less than ma; since we are testing for a
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positive change in the cumulative CPI slope after OTB, it is a one-tailed test. If OTB has
an effect on the cumulative CPI median slope location, we will reject Ho and conclude
that Ha is true (median before is statistically less than the median after). If OTB has no
effect, we will fail to reject Ho and conclude that Ho is true (median locations are
statistically equal).

Null Hypothesis (Ho):

mb

=

ma

(2)

Alternative Hypothesis (Ha):

mb

<

ma

(3)

The variable of interest, cumulative CPI slope, is a continuous random variable,
not normally distributed (Figures 7 and 8). We ran Minitab® Kolmogorov-Smirnov (KS)
test to determine normality; given a KS value greater than 0.05 (alpha level) and visual
inspection of the plotted data, we reject the assumption of normality. Given normality
fails, we must employ a nonparametric test to compare the median locations.
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Normality Test Cum CPI Slopes Before (b)
Normal

99

Mean
StDev
N
KS
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Figure 7: Normality Test for Cumulative CPI Slopes Before OTB

Normality Test Cum CPI Slopes After (a)
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Figure 8: Normality Test for Cumulative CPI Slopes After OTB
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Mann-Whitney U-Test
"Nonparametric methods (distribution-free tests) focus on the location of the
probability distribution of the population, rather than on specific parameters of the
population, such as the mean (hence, the name nonparametrics)" (McClave, 2008).
Specifically, the Mann-Whitney U-Test utilizes a research design involving two
independent samples that represent two populations with different median locations
(Sheskin, 2007). In our research, the Mann-Whitney U-Test ranks the cumulative CPI
slopes before and after OTB and calculates a U-statistic to determine if there is a
significant difference in the median location of the samples tested.
In instances where the Minitab® Mann-Whitney test did not produce a p-value,
the JMP® Wilcoxon Rank Sums "2-Sample Test, Normal Approximation, Prob>|Z|"
value is halved to calculate a one-tailed p-value. Concerning the Wilcoxon Rank Sum
Test, McClave notes "another statistic used for comparing two populations based on
independent random samples is the Mann-Whitney U-statistic. The U-statistic is a simple
function of the rank sums. It can be shown that the Wilcoxon rank sum test and the
Mann-Whitney U-test are equivalent" (McClave, 2008).
The following assumptions apply to the use of the Mann-Whitney U-Test
(Sheskin, 2008). First, the samples must be randomly selected from the population they
represent (Sheskin, 2008); in 2010, Thickstun found that the occurrence of OTB was in
fact "random". Our research pulls these random occurrences from the DAES database
via DAMIR retrieval.
Further, the two samples must be independent. Not only are the programs
independent (different capabilities, technical risk, schedule, funding and management,
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etc...), the slopes before and after OTB are independent for having gone through the OTB
treatment; "cumulative indices will only reflect the performance since the new baseline
was implemented" (DAU, 2007).
Beyond independence, the variable of interest must be a continuous random
variable (Sheskin, 2008). Cumulative CPI slope is a continuous random variable in that
slope can take on any value and this variable quality mitigates the risk of ranking ties.
As a final assumption, Sheskin notes that "the underlying distributions from
which the samples are derived are identical in shape" (Sheskin, 2008). Figure 9 depicts
similarity in shape with the exception of outliers; the Mann-Whitney U-Test adjusts for
outliers in comparison to other parametric tests.

Probability Plot of CPI Slopes b, CPI Slopes a
Normal - 95% CI
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Figure 9: Similar Distribution Shapes; Cumulative CPI Slopes Before, After OTB
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Past researchers utilized the Mann-Whitney U-Test to assess the effectiveness of
acquisition reform legislature. Christensen found reform efforts from 1960 to 1999
ineffective in reducing average cost growth of 20 percent during that timeframe
(Christensen, 1999). In 2003, Holbrook "discovered that cost performance for contracts
completed after reform initiative implementation was no different than cost performance
on contracts completed before implementation" (Holbrook, 2003).

Chapter Summary
In Chapter III, we explained the source of our data, provided the cumulative CPI
slope calculation, presented the hypothesis test and discussed the assumptions of the
Mann-Whitney U-Test. Having established the validity of the test and calculations
performed, we present the results of our statistical tests in Chapter IV and stress our data
limitations. In Chapter V, we draw conclusions based on our results, discuss the policy
implications of our findings and recommend topics of further study.
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IV: Results and Analysis
In Chapter IV, we present the results of our statistical tests, analyze the outcomes
and discuss our data limitations. In Chapter V, we conclude with policy implications and
recommended topics of further study.
Results
To summarize the hypothesis and tests (95% confidence; alpha 0.05), utilizing
Minitab® Mann-Whitney U-Test and JMP® Wilcoxon Rank Sums, we examine the
distribution of cumulative CPI slopes before and after OTB for a change in median
location. Table 6 summarizes the P-Value results for the number of OTB efforts tested in
a given time period after OTB and for the factor in question. Given our data limitations,
the most reliable results rest in the "All" row. We performed further sensitivity analysis
by varying time after OTB by factor, but the results are limited by small sample sizes (n)
and percentages of the total number of OTB efforts.
Concerning table interpretation (Table 6), P-Value is defined as "the observed
significance level, or p-value, for a specific statistical test is the probability (assuming Ho
is true) of observing a value of the test statistic that is at least as contradictory to the null
hypothesis, and supportive of the alternative hypothesis, as the actual one computed from
the sample data" (McClave, 2008). Essentially, if the P-Value is less than alpha (0.05),
we reject Ho and accept Ha; if the P-Value is greater than alpha, we fail to reject Ho.
Considering our hypothesis and our test procedure, failing to reject Ho means that OTB
has no effect on changing the median location of the cumulative CPI slopes before and
after OTB; the median locations are equal (2). Additionally, the Service factor of "DoD"
consistently had Insufficient Data Points (IDP); one data point did not enable testing.
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Table 6: Results of OTB's Effect on Cumulative CPI Slope After OTB

Analysis
With the exception of RDTE at +6 months, all p-values (Table 6) are greater than
alpha (0.05). Given our results, we fail to reject the Ho (2) and conclude that the median
location of the cumulative CPI slope distribution before OTB is equal to the median
location of the cumulative CPI slope distribution after OTB. OTB treatments have no
effect on the cumulative CPI slope after OTB. Further, OTB's effect on the cumulative
CPI slopes after OTB is not sensitive to time and/or the programmatic factors chosen in
this study.
Borderline significance is noted in the RDTE category at +6 months (p-value of
0.0414, Table 6), but the size of the sample (n = 8) and limitations of the data do not

34

allow us to confidently reject the Ho and state that OTB has an effect on the Cumulative
CPI slope after OTB. Given our data limitations and the skepticism that surrounds early
CPI index use after OTB, we are not willing to commit a Type I error and incorrectly
state that "OTB increases the cumulative CPI slope for RDTE contracts".
At the 90% confidence level (alpha 0.10), there appears to be significance in the
rows of RDTE, Army and Cost Plus contracts (Table 6). Given data limitations, we are
unwilling to commit a Type I error and state that OTB has an effect. In percentage of
total sample, RDTE, Army and Cost Plus represent 19%, 19% and 47%, respectively.
Again, we have consciously decided to risk a Type II error vs. a Type I error given the
small percentages and relatively high p-values.
Additionally, when comparing "Service" p-values and "Type" contract p-values
(Table 6), we note large differences between the row factors. Again, any significance
that could potentially be drawn from these differences is diminished by small sample size
and percentages at the factor level and further diminished by our insignificant finding in
"All".

Limitations
We summarize our limitations by type risk of statistical error. Concerning the
risk of a Type I error (risk of rejecting a true null hypothesis or “incorrectly stating there
is an effect”), the most obvious limitation is our small sample size of 47 (Table 6).
Within our table of results, it is apparent that some factor and time intersections have a
very small percentage of the final dataset, the largest being "Navy" at approximately
62%. The majority of factor percentages are less than 26% of the sample total. The most
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significant row in Table 6 is the "All" row; it represents all 47 OTBs being tested for
treatment effect across time and we are unable to reject Ho due to p-values greater than
0.05 and 0.10.
Additionally, concerning the risk of committing a Type I error, we note the small
percentage of OTB contract efforts being studied within the DAMIR database and within
the population of system-identified OTB contract efforts (Table 5). By the numbers,
approximately 7% of contract efforts maintained in DAMIR are reported as OTB. After
necessary exclusions (Table 5), our 47 OTB contract efforts represent approximately
1.5% of total DAMIR contract efforts and 21% of initially-identified OTB contract
efforts.
To summarize the Type I limitations, these are small, purified numbers (Table 5)
and percentages that support the validity of the test and design; we should have seen an
effect, but we did not (Table 6). We are unwilling to conclude that OTB has a borderline
effect on the cumulative CPI after OTB and risk a Type I error.
Concerning the limitations surrounding a Type II statistical error (risk of rejecting
a true alternative hypothesis or “letting an effect go free”), our attention turns to the slope
data content. In our research, we studied cumulative CPI data. The cumulative CPI data
is historical in nature and based on “time now” totals (EV and AC) from program
inception. This quality anchors performance to the past, meaning cumulative CPI is very
difficult to change. Our data selection increases the risk of a Type II statistical error,
meaning that we may have let an “effect go free” by choosing averaged performance
data. In Chapter V, we will recommend a within-scope data remedy to address this issue.
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V: Discussion and Conclusion
OTB is a subset of cost growth. At the contract effort level, the stated goal of an
OTB EVM intervention is to gain managerial control of a project's remaining work; for
any program, in any status, gaining managerial control of remaining work is a worthwhile
goal. The OTB process is a bottoms-up, collaborative assessment of remaining work that
is centered on risk analysis in which cost and schedule variances are typically removed
and funding is added in excess of the original contract budget base. The OTB guide
states, “it is important that the project managers recognize that a robust risk analysis for
the remaining project has resulted in a realistic schedule and budget baseline…it is now
more important than ever to have a risk management strategy that encompasses integrated
risk analysis and risk mitigation” (DAU, 2007).
Research Questions, Results and Limitations
Our research studied two specific questions concerning OTB's effect on
cumulative CPI slope after OTB:
1) Does the OTB process (treatment) improve the cumulative CPI's rate of
change (cumulative CPI slope) after OTB?
2) Is the cumulative CPI slope after OTB sensitive to time and/or programmatic
factors to include contract type, military service and the purpose of the appropriation?
For the data studied, we find there is no statistically significant change in
cumulative CPI slope after an OTB intervention; OTB does not gain managerial cost
control of remaining work with respect to the cumulative CPI slope. Further, we
conducted sensitivity analysis to determine if time and programmatic factors affect OTB's
effect on cumulative CPI. We find borderline significance in the factors of RDTE, Army
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and Cost Plus contracts, but given the data limitations, we remain unwilling to state that
OTB has an effect on gaining managerial control of cost with respect to the cumulative
CPI slope. We conclude that OTB does not increase the cumulative CPI slope after OTB.
Concerning data limitations, in order to validly utilize the design of our research
and perform the statistical methods discussed, we excluded a large percentage of OTB
data from the original data pull (Table 5). Having utilized only 21% of the OTB data and
its small percentage of the total contract efforts maintained in DAMIR, we limit our
finding that OTB has no effect the cumulative CPI slope after OTB. Additionally
concerning results presented in Table 6, our "borderline" factor significance is very
unreliable due to small sample sizes and small percentages of the total OTB contract
efforts studied. Consistent with these limitations, we avoid Type I errors by failing to
reject Ho in all instances. Finally, our choice to study cumulative CPI dampens our
ability to see the effect of current management actions and raises our probability of
making a Type II statistical error; essentially, our cumulative data selection has raised our
risk of incorrectly stating “no effect.”

Policy Implications
Qualified by our limitations, our research empirically characterizes OTB as
ineffective in improving cost performance as it relates to improving the cumulative CPI
slope after OTB. As such, we recommend disallowing the implementation of a formal
OTB unless explicitly justified by a more robust and standardized OTB cost/benefit
analysis.

Per DCMA‟s 2006 EVM implementation guide, once the contractor has

submitted an OTB request, the customer has 30 days to approve or disapprove the
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request. If disapproved, “the PM should provide specific reasons as to why it was denied
and what is required to obtain approval”; PMs should utilize this approval process to
require a more stringent cost/benefit analysis of the contractor to justify the OTB
investment.
From the cumulative CPI slope viewpoint, the contractor should not remove
historical variances, add funding to the existing requirement and continue to overrun the
program at the same cumulative CPI rate pre- and post-OTB. The cumulative CPI slope,
normally a negative slope that denotes a progressively growing overrun, should improve
for having gone through the OTB process. At a minimum, we should see some impact
within the first six months after OTB; this time period mitigates the cumulative CPI data
anchoring effect. Further, the contractor‟s justification should include a discussion of
increasing the cumulative CPI slope after OTB and the difference in estimated overrun
costs if OTB actions are not taken.
Thickstun notes that OTB costs are in addition to TAB; essentially, there
is an incremental cost of doing OTB business (Thickstun, 2010). That incremental OTB
cost should produce a quantifiable return on investment. The customer PM should be
able to assess the “impact if OTB is not funded.” We believe this is a more quantifiable
way of achieving and justifying an OTB investment. Cukr states it's "possible just to
continue" (Cukr, 2000); if not justified, just continue and save the time, the additional
work, the historical information and the financial resources.
Future Research
Our research did not quantify the potential cost savings of such a policy decision,
but future research should attempt to determine potential savings.
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In terms of disallowing OTB completely, we recommend gathering additional
evidence of “OTB not increasing CPI slope” within the scope of this study based on
current period CPR data only, not cumulative. This approach to data selection will
provide greater insight into current or more near-term PM actions. The cumulative data
is anchored in historical performance, meaning it is very difficult to change and limits our
finding and correspondingly, the policy implication of disallowing OTB. However, this
limitation does not eliminate the recommendation to better justify an OTB investment.
Additionally, the acquisition community should identify “treatment”-type
processes in the acquisition life cycle, perhaps rolling Integrated Baseline Reviews (IBR)
or EVMS surveillance activities tied to ANSI guidelines, to implement standardized,
repeatable assessments at the contract level. Obtaining this data in a systematic and
objective nature will allow the acquisition community to research meaningful
relationships between program actions and superior contract performance. Once
identified, program managers can build their execution plans centered on the most
effective actions to effect improved cost, schedule and performance outcomes.
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Appendix A: DAU EVM 'Gold Card'

41

References
Christensen, David S., and Kirk Payne. "Cost Performance Index Stability - Fact or
Fiction?" Journal of Parametrics, 10: 27-40 (April 1992).
Christensen, David S., Richard D. Antolini, John W. McKinney, and the Air Force
Institute of Technology. “A Review of Estimate at Completion Research,” Journal of
Cost Analysis, 41:62 (Spring 1995).
Christensen, David S. “Determining an Accurate Estimate at Completion.” National
Contract Management Journal, 25: 17-25 (Spring 1993).
Christensen, David S. "Project Advocacy and the Estimate at Completion Problem."
Journal of Cost Analysis, 35-60 (Spring 1996).
Christensen, David S. “The EAC Problem - A Review of 3 Studies.” Project
Management Journal, 24: 37-42 (March 1993).
Christensen, David S. “The Impact of the Packard Commission's Recommendations on
Reducing Cost Overruns on Defense Acquisition Contracts." Acquisition Review
Quarterly, 251-262 (Summer 1999).
Christensen, David S. “Value Cost Management Report to Evaluate the Contractor‟s
Estimate at Completion.” Acquisition Review Quarterly, 283-291 (Summer 1993).
Cukr, Anita. “When is the Over Target Baseline (OTB) Necessary?" The Measurable
News, 12-14 (April 2000).
Defense Contract Management Agency (DCMA), Earned Value Management
Implementation Guide, Oct 2006.
Defense Acquisition University (DAU), EVM 'Gold Card'. Jan 2009.
Department of Defense. Operation of the Defense Acquisition System. DoD Instruction
5000.02. USD (AT&L). 8 December 2008.
Department of Defense. The Defense Acquisition System. DoD Directive 5000.01. USD
(AT&L). 12 May 2003.
Department of Defense. Defense Federal Acquisition Regulation Supplement: Earned
Value Management Systems. CFR 48-234. Washington: OUSD (AT&L), 23 April 2008.
Fleming, Quentin W. and Joel M. Koppelman. Earned Value: Project Management.
Newtown Square: Project Management Institute, Inc., 2000.

42

General Services Administration, Department of Defense, National Aeronautics and
Space Administration. Federal Acquisition Regulation (FAR). March 2005.
Government Accountability Office (GAO). DOD Must Prioritize Its Weapon System
Acquisitions and Balance Them with Available Resources. GAO- 09-501T. Washington:
GPO, 18 March 2009.
Government Accountability Office (GAO). Making Tough Budget Choices to Create a
Better Future. GAO- 08-604CG. Washington: GPO, 12 March 2008.
Henderson, Kym and Ofer Zwikael. “Does Project Performance Stability Exist?...a reexamination of CPI and evaluation of SPI(t) stability.” The Measurable News, 4:7, 17-2.
(Fall, 2008).
Holbrook, Mark. An Analysis of the Implementation of Acquisition Reform Initiatives
and Contract Cost Variance. MS thesis, Graduate School of Engineering and
Management, Air Force Institute of Technology (AU), Wright-Patterson AFB OH, March
2003.
JMP®. Version 8. (Academic) computer software. Cary, NC: SAS Institute Inc., 2009.
McClave, James T. and others. Statistics for Business and Economics. Upper Saddle
River: Pearson Education Inc., 2008.
Minitab®. Version 15. (Academic) computer software. USA: Minitab Inc., 2006.
Office of Management and Budget. Preparation, Submission and Execution of the
Budget. OMB Circular No. A-11, June 2008.
Popp, Michael. Probability Distributions of CPI at Complete vs. CPI Today, Internal
NAVAIR Report, Unpublished, 1996.
Searle, David A. The Impact of the Packard Commission’s Recommendations on
Reducing Cost Overruns in Major Defense Acquisition Programs. MS Thesis. Graduate
School of Logistics and Acquisition Management, Air Force Institute of Technology
(AU), Wright-Patterson AFB OH, September 1997.
Sheskin, David J., Handbook of Parametric and Nonparametric Statistical Procedures.
Boca Raton: Chapman & Hall/CRC, 2007.
The Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. Memorandum
concerning Use of Earned Value Management (EVM) in the Department of Defense.
Pentagon, Washington DC, 3 July 2007.

43

The Under Secretary of Defense, Acquisition, Technology and Logistics. Memorandum
concerning Earned Value Management Systems Performance, Oversight and
Governance. Pentagon, Washington DC, 24 January 2009.
Thickstun, Kristine E. Predicting Over Target Baseline (OTB) Acquisition Contracts,
MS Thesis. AFIT/GCA/ENC/10-01. Graduate School of Engineering and Management,
Air Force Institute of Technology (AU), Wright-Patterson AFB OH, March 2010.
Tracy, Steven P. Estimate At Completion: A Regression Approach To Earned Value. MS
Thesis. Graduate School of Engineering and Management, Air Force Institute of
Technology (AU), Wright-Patterson AFB OH, March 2005.
Trahan, Elizabeth. An Evaluation of Growth Models as Predictive Tools for Estimates at
Completion (EAC). MS Thesis, AFIT/GFA/ENC/09-01. Graduate School of
Engineering and Management, Air Force Institute of Technology (AU), Wright Patterson
AFB OH, March 2009.
Trochim, William M.K. and Donnelly, James P. The Research Methods Knowledge Base,
Mason: Atomic Dog, 2008.
United States Congress. Weapons Systems Acquisition Reform Act of 2009. Public Law
No. 111-23, 111th Congress. Washington: GPO, 22 May 2009.

44

REPORT DOCUMENTATION PAGE

Form Approved
OMB No. 074-0188

The public reporting burden for this collection of information is estimated to average 1 hour per response, including the time for reviewing instructions,
searching existing data sources, gathering and maintaining the data needed, and completing and reviewing the collection of in formation. Send comments
regarding this burden estimate or any other aspect of the collection of information, including suggestions for reducing this burden to Department of Defense,
Washington Headquarters Services, Directorate for Information Operations and Reports (0704-0188), 1215 Jefferson Davis Highway, Suite 1204, Arlington,
VA 22202-4302. Respondents should be aware that notwithstanding any other provision of law, no person shall be subject to an penalty for failing to comply
with a collection of information if it does not display a currently valid OMB control number.

PLEASE DO NOT RETURN YOUR FORM TO THE ABOVE ADDRESS.

1. REPORT DATE (DD-MM- 2. REPORT TYPE
YYYY)
Master's Thesis
17-06-2010
4. TITLE AND SUBTITLE
CONTRACT OVER TARGET BASELINE (OTB) EFFECT ON EARNED
VALUE MANAGEMENT’S COST PERFORMANCE INDEX (CPI)

3. DATES COVERED (From – To)
June 2009 - June 2010
5a. CONTRACT NUMBER
5b. GRANT NUMBER
5c. PROGRAM ELEMENT NUMBER

6.

AUTHOR(S)

5d. PROJECT NUMBER
5e. TASK NUMBER

Jack, Dennis E., Major, USAF

5f. WORK UNIT NUMBER
7. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION NAMES(S) AND ADDRESS(S)
Air Force Institute of Technology
Graduate School of Engineering and Management (AFIT/EN)
2950 Hobson Way
WPAFB, OH 45433-7765
9. SPONSORING/MONITORING AGENCY NAME(S) AND ADDRESS(ES)
Gaile Argiro
Executive Administrator
PMI College of Performance Management
101 S. Whiting Street, Suite 320
Alexandria, VA 22304
12. DISTRIBUTION/AVAILABILITY STATEMENT

8. PERFORMING ORGANIZATION
REPORT NUMBER
AFIT/GCA/ENC/10-02
10. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S
ACRONYM(S)
11. SPONSOR/MONITOR’S
REPORT NUMBER(S)

APPROVED FOR PUBLIC RELEASE; DISTRIBUTION UNLIMITED.
13. SUPPLEMENTARY NOTES
14. ABSTRACT
Cost growth is a problem in U.S. Department of Defense (DoD) acquisitions. A particular component of cost growth is
a cost overrun or Over Target Baseline (OTB). In 2009, Trahan found that the Gompertz growth curve better predicted
program Estimates at Completion (EAC) for OTB contracts. In 2010, Thickstun studied “the relationships between
overruns and a variety of factors,” but found OTB occurrences “random” and questioned the benefit of the OTB
process (Thickstun, 2010). In this research, we study OTB’s ability to effect improved program cost performance; we
examine OTB’s effect on the cumulative Cost Performance Index (CPI) slope after an OTB intervention. We find there
is no statistically significant change in cumulative CPI slope after OTB. For the data studied, an OTB investment does
not significantly improve management’s ability to earn cost value as reflected in the cumulative CPI slope.
15. SUBJECT TERMS
Over Target Baseline (OTB), Earned Value Management (EVM), Cost Performance Index (CPI), Mann-Whitney Test,
cost overrun
16. SECURITY CLASSIFICATION
17.
18.
19a. NAME OF RESPONSIBLE
OF:
LIMITATION
NUMBER
PERSON
OF
OF
Dr. Edward D. White (AFIT/ENC)
a.
REPORT
b.
ABSTRACT
c. THIS
ABSTRACT
PAGES
19b. TELEPHONE NUMBER (Include
PAGE
area code)
U
U
UU
54
(937) 785-3636 ext.4540 EMAIL:
U
EDWARD.WHITE@AFIT.EDU
Standard Form 298 (Rev. 8-98)
Prescribed by ANSI Std. Z39-18

Form Approved
OMB No. 074-0188

45

